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EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EFFECTIVE INCOME TAX RATES
& CAPITAL GAINS REALIZATIONS
Connor Chase
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between capital gains realizations and the effective income tax rate is one
that has been thoroughly explored by economists in recent years to better understand how to
enact effective policy. Capital gains are commonly defined as profits from the sale of property or
investments and are realized when they are sold for either a profit or a loss. Realization does not
account for any fluctuating asset prices between the time that the asset was acquired and when it
was sold, it only entails the value of the asset at the time of sale. When capital gains are sold for
a net profit, they are taxed as individual income and generate tax revenue, making them a policy
variable of considerable interest. Policymakers have long since speculated that raising the
effective income tax rate could result in individuals holding their assets for a longer period of
time, rather than realizing gains on their assets. This assumption has led to the exploration of the
relationship between capital gains realizations and the effective income tax rate, with hopes of
establishing better tax policy at both the state and the federal levels. In this experiment, I suggest
that policymakers can increase tax revenue by lowering the effective capital gains tax rate rather
than raising it. Based on previous literature, raising the income tax rate can lead to individuals
holding on to capital longer rather than realizing their gains.
While the results from previous studies have yielded similar conclusions, the exploration of
the relationship between the tax rate and capital gains realizations is a relatively new area of
study in econometrics. Previous studies have shown that an inverse relationship exists between
the effective income tax rate and capital gains realizations, meaning that as the tax rate is
increased, the amount of capital gains that are realized as personal income decreases. The
primary literature upon which this experiment is based, measured the elasticity of capital gains
realizations to the effective income tax rate. Economists and professors at Williams College, Jon
M. Bakija and William M. Gentry, in their work, “Capital Gains Taxes and Realizations:
Evidence from a long panel of state-level data”, collected a panel series of data across the fifty
states in the U.S. over a time span of fifty years. Their primary dependent variable of interest was
the natural logarithm of the average value of a realized capital gain among federal income tax
filers and their primary independent variable of interest was the combined federal and state
income tax rate, expressed in decimal terms (Gentry and Bakija, 2014). Some control variables
that were used in their study included: a college variable which indicated the college graduates as
a share of state residents over 25, percent of homeowners, the share of people that are 65 years of
age or older in the state, and the state unemployment rate (Bakija and Gentry, 2014). Bakija and
Gentry controlled for state fixed effects and year fixed effects in their study by running a twoway fixed effects model. The fifty-year panel data in this study allowed for their regressions to
observe long-term variation among state income tax rates. Their findings suggested that capital
gains realizations are sensitive to changes in the income tax rate and that a negative relationship
exists between the two. Elasticities of -0.66 and -0.65 were primarily reported in Bakija and
Gentry’s study which was consistent with the previous literature by which they referenced to in
conducting their study (Bakija and Gentry, 2014).
Another Primary source for this study was conducted by William M. Gentry and William
T. Bogart, President of Maryville College. The purpose of Gentry and Bogarts’ study was to
further examine the relationship between capital gains realizations and the effective income tax

rate. Their primary dependent variable of interest was the natural logarithm of capital gains
realizations per tax return, and their primary independent variables of interest included: the
natural logarithm of wages per capita, the fraction of state population aged 65 years or older,
fraction of the state population that owns a home, median home value in a state, stock ownership,
and the federal and state marginal tax rate for high income households (Gentry and Bogart,
1993). Their findings produced similar results to those of the study conducted by Bakija and
Gentry, showing an elasticity of realizations with respect to the tax rate of -0.67 (Bogart and
Gentry,1993). Bogart and Gentry found the elasticity to be even larger, in absolute value, at -1.00
at the 2% level of significance, which was indicative of a strong negative relationship between
capital gains realizations and the effective income tax rate (Bogart and Gentry, 1993). Both of
the primary research papers that were used to conduct this study reflected only the direct revenue
consequences of the capital gains taxes, instead of addressing any other arguments that advocate
for or against cutting the capital gains tax rate (Gentry and Bogart, 1993).
Another study related to capital gains was conducted by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), Tim Dowd, Robert McClelland, and Athiphat Muthitacharoen, in 2012 that sought to
explore the relationship between capital gains realizations in the long-run and persistent
transitory tax changes (Dowd et. al 2012). Their study compared the amount that an individual
decides to realize based on the tax rate, not just whether or not an individual realizes at all
(Dowd et. al 2012). Their findings suggest that the decision of how much to realize is more
sensitive to changes in rates of taxation than the decision to realize a gain (Dowd, et. al 2012).
The elasticities in this study ranged from roughly -0.58 to -1.0 and panel data was collected from
2006 through 2012 across all 50 states in the U.S. The CBO study was unique from other studies
that were explored because this study did not seek to measure the elasticity of capital gains
realizations with respect to the income tax rate. By comparison, this study sought to estimate the
percent change in the number of capital gains realizations reported as income given a one
percentage point increase in the highest marginal state income tax rates. The control variables
used varied slightly from those in previous studies because they included state unemployment
rates, state population estimates, a dummy variable for political party association (whether a
legislative chamber held a majority in a state in a given year), and the state’s lowest income tax
rate. The regressions that were run included: pooled OLS, one-way entity fixed effects, and twoway time and entity fixed effects. The results did not show a statistically significant relationship
between the highest state income tax rate and the number of realizations that were reported as
income. However, the results were reasonably sensible; the coefficient on the highest state
income tax rate was negative in 3 out of the 5 regressions that were run. The CBO findings are
congruent with previous literature, which has suggested that a negative relationship exists
between the highest income tax rate and the amount of capital gains realizations.
II. DATA
Data for the present study was collected from a wide variety of sources. Population data for
each state between the years of 2006-2012 was accessed through the U.S. Census Bureau. The
data for the unemployment rate for each state over the same period was accessed via the U.S.
Bureau for Labor Statistics. The capital gains revenue data was accessed through a variety of
different sources including: the IRS, the Tax Policy Center, and the Tax Foundation. The
primary dependent variable of interest in this study is the natural logarithm of the amount of
capital gains, which reflects the amount of capital gains that individuals will realize based on
changes to the independent variables. The data for the state level income tax rates was accessed

via the Tax Policy Center. Finally, the data concerning the state legislature composition was
gathered via the National Conference of State Legislatures. In addition to collecting this data, a
number of relevant tax policy articles were consulted, which provided a better understanding of
how capital gains are taxed as personal income, and reasons for variations in individual income
across different states for different time periods. The data sources consulted for this study
provided information for the years included here, 2006 through 2012.
The two-way fixed effects regression model is:
Yit= 1Xit + i + t + uit,
and in this study the primary variables for the two-way fixed effects model were:
lnAmountofCapitalGainsit=1Highincometaxit + I +t + uit,
where the Highincometax reflects the policy variable of interest, and the natural logarithm of the
amount of capital gains is the dependent variable of interest. The linear regression model with
only the primary policy variable of interest as an independent variable would be:
lnAmountofcapitalgainsi = 0 + 1Highincometaxi + ui ,
and the multiple regression model in this study that includes added control variables would be:
lnAmountofcapitalgainsi = 0 + 1Highincometaxi + 2Unemploymenti + 3Populationi +
4Lowincometaxi + 5Politicalpartyi + ui .
Figure 1, which provides summary statistics, can be found in the empirical results section of this
paper, along with the correlations of selected variables in Figures 2 and 3. The population
variable was expressed in 10,000’s in order to provide more workable data. The dummy variable
for political party association was coded 0 if the state legislature was held by a majority of
democratic representatives and was coded 1 if the state legislature was held by a majority of
republican representatives. The unemployment rate, as well as the tax rates, were expressed as
integers, thus their coefficients could be interpreted as a one-unit increase, or in this case, a one
percentage point increase.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS & INTERPRETATION
Figure 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Name |
Obs
AmountofCapitalGains |
350
Highincometax |
350
Unemployment |
269
Population |
350
Lowincometax |
350
Politicalparty |
343

Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
465481 520605.7
40952 3209841
5.597314 2.840116
0
11
6.555019 2.469852
2.4
13.8
6120251 6746522 515004 3.80e+07
2.397209 1.760214
0
6
.3702624 .4835803
0
1

Figure 1 displays the summary statistics. (Note: a few missing values were recorded for
the variables: political party and unemployment.) The population variable within Figure 1
includes the population mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values prior to the
addition of the population variable in thousands. The amount of capital gains is the actual
number of net positive capital gains that were reported as individual income, which includes
stocks and housing sales (assets). This variable was logged in the regressions, but in Figure 1,
these values reflect the real value prior to applying the natural logarithm ahead of the coefficient
later in the study. The high-income tax and low-income tax variables each have minimum values

of zero because of states that do not impose an income tax. Finally, the unemployment values are
reflected by peaks and troughs in the business cycle, which accounts for the relatively large
difference in the minimum and maximum values. As the economy began a recession in
December of 2007, the unemployment rate increased dramatically. The unemployment rate
reflects state level unemployment rates from the years 2006 through 2012.
Figure 2: Correlation of Capital Gains and Unemployment
LogAmountofCapitalGains | 1.0000
Unemployment |
0.1308 1.0000
Figure 3: Correlation of Capital Gains and High-Income Tax
LogAmountofCapitalGains | 1.0000
HighIncomeTax |
0.0043 1.0000
Figure 2 displays the correlation between the natural logarithm of capital gains and the
unemployment rate. Correlation assesses the linear relationship on a scale of 0 to 1 in absolute
value, 1 being a perfectly linear relationship. The state unemployment rate has a relatively weak
correlation with the natural logarithm of capital gains. However, its correlation coefficient makes
intuitive sense because one can reasonably expect there to be a positive linear relationship
between the amount of capital gains that are realized and the unemployment rate. For example,
the unemployment rate is a variable that is commonly used as an indication of how well the
economy is doing. If the unemployment rate increases, then one can suspect that the current state
of the economy is trending toward a recession, or away from an expansion. Therefore, it is likely
that an individual would be inclined to sell their assets at a time of economic instability or
downturn. The correlation between the high-income tax rate and the natural logarithm of capital
gains reflects a weak positive correlation. However, in the regression table below, Table 1, it can
be seen that by controlling for other variables, the high-income tax reflected a negative
relationship with the natural logarithm of capital gains in the pooled OLS regression

Table 1: Regression Results
(OLS)
High Income Tax

0.002
(0.025)

(Pooled OLS)
-0.027
(0.014)
0.000

(State FE)

(2-Way FE)

-0.025
(0.023)

-0.002
(0.004)

Population
(0.0001)**

Political Party

0.180
(0.077)*

Unemployment
-0.027
(0.013)*

Low Income Tax

State FE
Time FE

0.170
(0.021)**

No

No
No

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

No
cons

11.688

12.685

12.696

(0.131)**

(0.127)**

(0.021)**

0.76

0.01

12.539
(0.156)**
R2

0.00

0.96

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 1 provides a set of four different regression results, the first being a simple regression
of the natural logarithm of capital gains on the high-income tax rate. The results are not statistically
significant, and the coefficient suggests that a positive relationship between the high-income tax
rate and number of capital gains realized exists. The second regression is a pooled OLS regression
that contains a set of control variables. Population, political party, unemployment, and low-income
tax were statistically significant in the second regression, and their results make some intuitive
sense. For the population variable, one can expect that as the population increases, an increased
amount of capital gains realizations will occur. The political party variable is also reasonably
sensible, because states with a Republican majority state legislature are more likely to enact lower
income tax policies, encouraging an increased amount of capital gains realizations. In this case,
Republican majority state legislatures are associated with 18% more capital gains realizations. As
discussed earlier, with an increase in the unemployment rate, one can expect the amount of capital
gains realizations to decrease. The low-income tax rate variable is a bit more puzzling in its
interpretation. As the low-income tax rate increases, the amount of capital gains realizations
increased by 17%. The third regression is a one-way state fixed effects model that displays a
negative relationship between the natural logarithm and the high-income tax rate. While this result
appeared more sensible, it was not statistically significant. The interpretation of the coefficient in
the one-way state fixed effects model is that as the high-income tax rate increases by one unit (or

one percentage point) the amount of capital gains realizations decreases by 2.5%. Finally, the
fourth regression in Table 1 presents a two-way fixed effects model for time and state fixed effects,
which suggests that if the high-income tax rate increases by one unit, (or one percentage point)
then a decrease in -0.2% in capital gains realizations will occur; however, this result was not
statistically significant.

Figure 4: Regression Results Extended
(2-Way FE)
Variable:
Highincometax
-0.002
(0.35)
Lowincometax
0.008
(1.08)
Politicalparty
-0.018
(4.75)**
Unemployment
-0.002
(0.82)
lnpopulation
0.784
(4.14)**
_cons

2.656
(1.08)

R2

0.96

N

262

Figure 4 displays the regression results that occurred from re-running the two-way fixed
effects model and adding the additional independent variables, the control variables. This
regression produced a much higher value for R2; however, the interpretation of the coefficients
makes less intuitive sense. The primary independent variable of interest was not statistically
significant even in the fifth and final two-way fixed effects model. The relationship between
high-income tax rates and capital gains realizations is negative, based on the coefficient. This is
suggestive of the idea that if the high-income tax is increased by one percentage point, then the
amount of capital gains realized as personal income is expected to decrease by 0.2%. The
coefficient on low-income remained positive in the two-way fixed effects model, and the
coefficient on the state unemployment rate remained negative. In the final regression, a
coefficient for the natural logarithm of the population was added and produced statistically
significant results. The results indicated that if the population increased by 1% then the amount

of capital gains realizations that would occur would increase by roughly 78%. This coefficient
estimate is more than likely overstated and could potentially be indicative of omitted variable
bias. Potential threats to validity in this study include the relatively small sample size, which in
turn could produce an internal threat to validity. Since the high-income tax rate was not found to
be statistically significant, this would create threats to external validity, as it would be difficult to
apply the conclusions drawn from this study elsewhere.
IV. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Widespread proponents of economic equality advocate for higher tax rates on those that
earn the highest income. The exploration of the relationship between the rate of taxation amongst
the highest-income taxpayers and the amount of capital gains realizations that will be reported is
an area of policymaking that is in need of further investigation. The results from this study would
suggest that a negative relationship exists between the highest rate of income taxation and the
amount of capital gains that will be realized, and in turn, reported as individual income. Previous
studies have produced similar results, suggesting that the elasticity of capital gains realizations
with respect to the highest income tax rate is around -0.66, which indicates that the amount of
capital gains that are realized are sensitive to a change in the highest marginal rate of income
taxation.
There are many reasons to exhibit caution while interpreting both the results from this
study and those from other studies on this topic. Regarding this study, the primary independent
variable of interest did not produce statistically significant results; therefore, these findings
should be taken lightly. Based on the coefficient estimates of the independent variables in the
study, it is likely that omitted variable bias was a problem in the regressions that were run. In the
future, it will be advantageous to add more independent variables to these models in order to
reduce the likelihood that omitted variable bias is playing a significant role in the results. Finally,
the panel study could be extended over a longer span of time in order to capture a wider range of
data and potentially explain the short-term and long-term effects of adjusting the highest income
rate of taxation.
In summary, the relationship between capital gains realizations and the rate of income
taxation is an important area of exploration for policymakers, as it is associated with
fundamental economic variables, such as the generation of tax revenue. In the future, more
causal findings could equip policymakers with better evidence to make effective decisions when
it comes to setting the income tax rates. An experiment that can determine a causal relationship
between capital gains realizations and the income tax rates would allow policymakers to
potentially increase tax revenue, as policymakers would be able to predict at what point
individuals would stop recognizing capital gains as the tax rate increased.
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Data Appendix
The state unemployment rates were provided via the link in the references above from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and were recorded as integers in this study. The real amount of net
capital gains was provided via the link above from the IRS. These figures display the amount of
real net positive capital gains reported as income across states from the years 2006 through 2012.
The tax rates were provided via the Tax Policy Center article “Income Tax Paid at Each Tax
Rate, 1958-2009”. This article displays both the highest rates of income taxation and the lowest
rates of income taxation across states for the time periods of this study, 2006 through 2012. The
state legislature composition can be accessed via the article listed above on the composition of
state legislatures, which included data for all of the years in this study (2006-2012). A dummy
variable was used to create the variable “political party” where values of 0 were assigned to state
legislatures the held a democratic majority in the state legislature and values of 1 were assigned
to state legislatures that held a republican majority in the state legislature. Further, the regression
commands have been attached to the back of this study in order to understand how the
corresponding output for the regressions in Table 1 and Figure 4 were generated.

